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:l\IILIT.ARY POST NEAR CARLIN, NEV. 
LETTER 
FROM 
THE SECRETARY OF WAR, 
RELATIVE TO 
The establishment of a rnilitary post near Carlin, Nev. 
DECE:MBER 16, 1874.-Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs and ordered to 
be printed. 
WAR DEPART::.\lENT, 
December 14, 1874. 
The Secretary of War bas the honor to transmit to the House of Rep-
resentatives, for the consideration of the Committee on Military Affairs 
anrl the Committee on Appropriations, in ~onnection with his letter of the 
lOth instant and accompanying papers, relathre to the establishm ent 
of a military post near Carlin, Nev., copy of letter of thP 2d iust~nt from 
1\faj. Gen. J. M. Schofield, commanding Military Division of the Pacific, 
showing reasons why the post should be established. 
V\7 M, W. BELKNAP, 
Secretary of War. 
HEADQUARTERS l\fiLITARY DIVISION OF THE PACIFIC, 
San Francisco, Cal., December;· 2, 187 4. 
DEAR GENERAL: I am very glad to have your approval of my prop-
osition to concentrate the troops in the Department of California, and 
have no doubt Congress will see tile wisdom and economy of making 
the necessary appropriations to carry out our plans, when the facts are 
fully understood. 
There is in reality no question of increased appropriation, but simply 
one of appropriation under onf? bead rather than others. The proposed. 
concentration of troops will result in a single year in a saviug of ex-
pense equal to the cost of new quarters, and in a number of years the 
saving will be correspondingly great, viz, several times the cost of mak-
ing the change; so that on the side of economy, which of course Congress 
has mainly in view, the reasons are strong in favor of concentration, 
but the military reasons are stronger still. 
2 MILITARY PO~T NEAR CARLIN, NEVADA. 
The Army has been so much reduced that concentration is absolutely 
necessary to efficiency. An Army of twenty-five thousand men scat-
tered over the country, at as many separate stations as were formerly 
occupied by three times that number, would be almost nseless. When 
an emergency arises requiring active service of the troops in the field, 
they muRt be assembled from the widely-scattered posts, involving great 
delay, and then after leaving at posts the garrisons necessary to guard 
the public property, there will be few troops for service in the field, 
for as many men must be left to guard the publi~ property at a one-
company post as at a post of three companies. The strength of the 
Army is thus wasted by diffusion. 
It is true this necessary process of concentration bas been going o-q. 
to some extent as the Army has been reduced, but has been retarded 
by the lack of funds for building new quarters, and especi<cllly is this the 
case in the Department of California. The comparative peace that bas 
prevailed in this department, and the great demand for troops in those 
of the Columbia and Arizona, have resulted in reducing the garrisons in 
the Department of California to little more than the necessary post-
guards, while nearly all the money allotted to t.he division has been 
given to the .other departments where more needed. In the mean time 
changes in the status of Indians have rendered some of the posts un-
necessary, or of little use, while otllers are nearly useless, and very ex-
pensive, from very faulty location, tlleir sites having been selected in 
early days, before the location of the Pacific Railroad. 
In view of the prospective abandonment of the posts referred to, the 
greatest economy has been practiced in respect to the buildings, which 
are mere temvorary sllelters for the men and animals, and whicll have 
only been kept in such state of repair as the comfort of the troops abso-
lutely required. These temporar,y and now dilapidated posts cannot 
be continued much longer. Either new buildings must be erected or 
the posts must be abandoned. Indeed, the time has come when all 
reasons concur in favor of the construction of one new post in the De-
partment of California to take the place of two or more old ones. The 
posts wllich should be first abandoned are Camps Halleck and McDer-
mitt, the only two posts in Ne\·ada. It is now proposed to concentrate 
tlw two at a central point on the railroad, where the troops can be most 
economically supplied, and whence theJ can be most quickly sent to any 
point their services may be required. By this means the very small 
force-t.hree or four companies-available for service in Nevada may be 
made to do the work wllich would, if the Army were large enough, be 
allotted to a much larger force. 
There is one other consideration, and a very important one, in favor 
of the proposed concentration; that is, the improved discipline and in-
creased efficiency which result from keeping troops habitually in con-
siderable bodies, under the immediate command of tl.te superior officers. 
When troops are Rcattered at one and two company posts, the field-
officers of the higllest rank, character, and experience are without 
appropriate commands, and their services are almost lost to the Go\Tern-
meut. 
Very respectfully and very truly, yours, 
Gen. W. W. BELICNAP, 
Secretary of W,..ar, TI'ashington, D. G. 
0 
J. M. SCHOFIELD, 
JJfajor- General. 
